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Abstract: A Multi Expert Multi Criteria Decision Making problem is considered, in which a 
consensus model is guided by both consensus and false consensus effects. The consensus reaching 
process is guided automatically and it is modelled within OWA operators. Our study contributes by 
investigating the impact of the description of the choice option and the form of the judgement task 
on the magnitude of the agreement in the case of presence of the false consensus effect. 
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1. False Consensus Effect 
The need to predict the preferences of others arises in numerous marketing contexts. Consumers 
frequently need to predict the preference of others and marketers routinely judge what product 
offerings may be more or less attractive to potential buyers. The idea that people project onto others 
their own beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions has a long history [5], [6], [7].  
The issue of projecting from the self to predict others’ preferences has been investigated in social 
psychology and one robust findings is that people with a certain preference tend to make higher 
judgements of the popularity of that preference in others, compared to the judgements of those with 
different preferences. This empirical result has been termed the “false consensus” effect [7]. This 
effect is characterized by a tendency to overestimate the extent to which other people share one’s 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours [3]. 
In social perception and attribution, people tend to assume that their own responses are more 
common than they really are and to consider alternative responses as uncommon, deviant or 
inappropriate [8]. 
Curiously, there has been no research on one of most intriguing explanations of the false consensus 
effect: an explanation that is focused on the resolution of ambiguities inherent in most choice 
problems. 
 
2. Evaluations for consensus and aggregation operators 
A difficulty that has to be addressed when dealing with real Multi Expert Multi Criteria Decision 
problems is the presence of the false consensus effect because it can lead to an absence of 
objectivity in the evaluation process.  
Let us assume the decision theoretical paradigm in [2]. Therefore it seems appropriate, in an 
evaluation formulated by the expert, to distinguish the contribution to the decision due to technical 
and political judgements from the one determined by false consensus effect. It results that the 
opinion of each expert is decomposed into two components: a vector, made of the ranking of the 
alternatives, built by means of a “classical” procedure, e. g.  a hierarchical procedure, and a fuzzy 
component that represents the contribution of the false consensus effect, that we assume to be fuzzy 
in nature. This allows us to consider in the sequel aggregation operators, such as OWA operators. 
The formal model considers the set N of decision makers, the set A of the alternatives and the set C 
of the criteria. Our starting point here is a method inspired by [2] and developed by [4]. 
Let any decision maker i∈N be able to assess the relevance of each criterion. Precisely, for every i, 
a function 
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hi: C→[0, 1], 
with hi (c)=1
c∈C
∑ , denoting the evaluation or weight that the decision maker assigns to the criterion 
c, is defined. 
Furthermore the function gi: A×C→[0, 1] is defined, such that gi(a, c) is the value of the alternative 
a with respect to the criterion c, in the perspective of i. The values  hi(c) and gi(a, c) can be 
determined by suitable procedures [1]. 
Let n, p, m, denote the (positive integer) numbers of the elements of the sets N, C and A, 
respectively. The value hi(c)c∈C  denotes the evaluation of the p-tuple of the criteria by the decision 
maker i and the value gi(c,a))c∈C, a ∈A denotes  the matrix  p×m whose elements are the evaluations, 
made by i, of the alternatives with respect to each criterion in C. Function f: A→[0, 1], defined by 
(fi(a))a∈A= (hi(c)c∈C)•(gi(c, a))c∈C, a∈A         (1) 
is the evaluation, made by i , of the alternative a∈A. 
A euclidean metrics, that acts between couples of decision makers i and j, i. e.,  between individual 
rankings of alternatives, is defined by 
d(fi,fj) = ∑
∈
−
Aa
ji afafA
2))()((1         (2) 
If the functions hi, gi range in [0, 1], then also 0≤ d(fi, fj)≤1. Hence the set of all decision makers is 
represented by a set of points of the unit cube in a euclidean space. 
If we set d*=max{d(fi, fj)| i, j∈N}, then a degree of consensus δ* can be defined as the complement 
to one of the maximum distance between two positions of the experts: 
δ(+)=1-d(+)=1-max{d(fi, fj) | i, j∈N}. 
We assume that the evaluation fi(a) of the alternative a to the decision maker i, may be split into 
two components: 
fi(a)=ki(a)K+hi(a)H            (3) 
This polynomial representation of a synthesis of a judgement stands for a numeric component 
ki(a)K that maintains all the available quantitative information and another addend hi(a)H, whose 
coefficient hi(a) reflects subjectivity, including our ability to infer information according to the false 
consensus effect. 
We can measure the level of consensus by means of the consensus function δ(+) and we can define 
also a dissent function δ(-)  as the complement to 1 of the consensus function. 
Yager [9] introduced an aggregation technique based on the concept of ordered weighted averaging 
(OWA) operators.  
Let [ ]1,0 ),,...,,( 21 ∈= in wwwww  and ∑ =i iw 1in nR  and f a mapping RRf n →:  defined by 
∑== j jjn bwaaafaf ,),...,,()( 21  where jb  is the j-th largest of the ia ’s. 
In other words the vector ),...,,( 21 nbbbb =  has components that are the decreasing rearrangement of 
the components of a. 
The function f is called on OWA operator (of dimension n) and the vector w a weight vector. Given 
a weight vector w, on OWA operator f defines a procedure of aggregation. A fundamental aspect of 
this operator is the re-ordering step of aggregates. 
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